OP-ED: Europe must resist temptation to deport Afghans into a rights vacuum

By Hameed Hakimi

In August 2024, Germany became the first European country to deport Afghans to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Although the deportation process was facilitated through Qatar, two things should be clear. First, the office of the then German chancellor maintained that Germany’s security concerns “clearly outweigh the protection interests” of those being deported, who were reportedly convicted of crimes in Germany. Second, it is inconceivable that Germany would be able to convince Taliban authorities to co-operate without any approval from their government in Kabul. In July this year, Germany’s new government deported a further 81 Afghan nationals who, according to the German interior ministry, possessed “a criminal record in the past”. Germany has been criticised by the United Nations, among others, for forcefully returning Afghans to Afghanistan. A United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “non-return advisory” continues to be in place, effectively a call for countries to avoid forcible returns to Afghanistan.

The prevalent political discourse across many European countries which favours the forced return of Afghan asylum seekers to Afghanistan means that Germany is not alone. According to the Belgian minister for asylum and migration, Anneleen Van Bossuyt, twenty European countries have teamed up to pressure the European Commission (EC) to prioritise deporting Afghan nationals who do not possess legal residence. These countries include 19 European Union (EU) member states and Norway; they are asking the EC to negotiate a returns policy with the Taliban. Exploring such a pathway for engagement with Afghanistan will have major political and legal ramifications for Europe, not least in relation to the rights of those faced with deportation. Ominously, this could also become a convenient opening for anti-migration policies to target more Afghan asylum seekers and refugees who are faced with difficulties in acquiring settlement in Europe.

Return of the Taliban

The Taliban swept to power in August 2021 and installed the so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) – the name the Taliban use to refer to their government. The IEA seized power as a direct result of the collapse of the former Western-backed and internationally recognised Afghan government: the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The Taliban’s return to power has faced a mix of tepid and pragmatic acceptance by Afghanistan’s immediate and regional neighbours, and other significant countries such as China, Turkey, Russia, and India, more recently. These countries have maintained varying degrees of mutual diplomatic relations with the Taliban government. However, only Moscow granted formal recognition to the current government in Kabul in July 2025, marking Russia as the only state that formally endorses the Taliban regime. International sanctions, the blacklisting of several key Taliban leaders, and a dismal human rights record have resulted in a significant isolation of the regime in Kabul. For the Taliban, projecting domestic legitimacy through expanding foreign relations is a key strategy.

European engagement with the Taliban since 2021

It is not common knowledge that six EU countries demanded the continuation of deportations to Afghanistan even as Taliban fighters were at the gates of Kabul and the group had not officially seized the seat of power in Afghanistan. The countries, which included Germany, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece, sent a signed letter to the EC urging that any halt in deportations would encourage more Afghans to seek asylum in Europe. Unsurprisingly, only days after the Taliban seized power, Josep Borrell, the then EU foreign policy chief, told reporters that the EU would need to talk to the Taliban. Although he said that the aim was to pursue pragmatic dialogue, it was clear that, as a bloc, the EU was keen for engagement with the new Taliban authorities. It is implausible that these views in Europe were not influenced by migration policies. Subsequently, in January 2022, the EU became the first – and remains the only – Western entity to re-establish its office in Kabul. The EC said at the time that re-establishing “a minimal presence of international EU delegation staff [was] to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and monitor the humanitarian situation”.

As the Taliban solidified their rule at home, seeking international recognition in parallel, the EU announced the framework underpinned by five benchmarks in September 2021 that a Taliban-led government needed to meet in order to qualify for political engagement with Europe. Security guarantees and respect for human rights topped the benchmarks. However, four years into the Taliban rule, it seems that a status quo has developed: Taliban authorities refuse compliance with demands from the EU and other Western donors, while the EU delegation maintains a presence in Afghanistan, arguing that its purpose is to monitor humanitarian efforts.

Due to the scarcity of data, the precise nature and extent of Taliban contact with EU officials and EU member states’ representatives are difficult to gauge. However, senior Taliban leaders continue to have meetings with officials from the EU and EU member states in countries such as Qatar, and through occasional European delegation visits to Kabul. As much as the European messaging on such contact emphasises its technical and transactional nature with a focus on the delivery of humanitarian aid, Taliban ministries and senior leaders capitalise on the optics to boost their legitimacy both domestically and externally.

The current legal and international co-operation landscape in Afghanistan

When the former Afghan government signed the Joint Way Forward (JWF) agreement with the EU on migration issues in October 2016, the agreement was openly and extensively scrutinised by the media, civil society and policy stakeholders in Afghanistan. The erstwhile Afghan parliament discussed the pact and subsequently adopted the agreement.

By stark contrast, the Taliban system of governance does not recognise the separation of powers. It does not have a constitution, nor is it committed to a codified judiciary or binding international treaties and obligations. In essence, it lacks all the fundamental components that characterise modern statecraft, including within systems that are not necessarily democratic. The Taliban courts are regulated through a peculiar Sharia interpretation of Islamic Law by individual Taliban-appointed judges, often clerics, who decide on cases in the absence of a codified legal and penal system. Without wider formal recognition and a systematised apparatus to pursue foreign relations, external actors agreeing to any policies can expect labyrinthine complexities and abstruse steps ranging from signing memoranda of understanding with relevant Taliban ministries to endorsing laws announced in a highly top-down Taliban hierarchical structure. Moreover, there is emerging evidence that the Taliban government may change course unilaterally if it deems that any agreements do not align with its interests, as the recent cancellation of a US$540 million contract with a Chinese company suggests.

Where do the rights and legal abyss in Afghanistan leave EU migration policymakers?

It is not yet clear if the EU will seek a formal agreement with the Taliban to ensure the deportation of Afghan nationals from Europe, mirroring the JWF, as such a move would be a clear acceptance of the Taliban government, even if it is a tacit acknowledgement. Sidestepping the reputational traps of a formal agreement with the Taliban by seeking “approval” of a European policy would expose EU decision-makers to an unorthodox partner with zero leverage. In both cases, the Taliban authorities would sell any engagement with the EU as a win-win domestically, shoring up the rhetoric that it is a stable government that the world is recognising, albeit slowly.

Given the current realities in Afghanistan, it is hard to imagine how the EU can ensure the coordination and reintegration of any Afghans deported to the country from Europe. As millions of Afghans are forcibly returned from neighbouring Iran and Pakistan, Afghanistan is confronted by a growing crisis of millions of internally displaced people amidst a lack of resources, jobs and long-term policies for returnees to be reintegrated. Opening the gates to forced returns of Afghans from Europe would further deepen the humanitarian and human rights crises.

It is absolutely paramount that the EU considers all the precarities involved in reaching any deal with the Taliban government that could tarnish European credibility and put Afghan deportees in a dangerous loop. It would also result in a dichotomy of offering the Taliban regime political and legal legitimacy while claiming that the EU is only pursuing “technical” contact.

Hameed Hakimi is an Associate Fellow at Chatham House and a Senior Fellow (non-resident) at the Atlantic Council.